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Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall
International, Inc. and the
Consequences of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act
By KIRSTEN HANDELMAN*
PROVIDING EMPLOYEES WITH a workplace free from harassment,
discrimination, and criminal acts is a primary concern of both employ-
ers and their legal counsel across the nation.' When faced with allega-
tions of employee misconduct, employers'are wise to take swift
action. 2 However, in many instances it is impossible to definitively
prove that an accused engaged in the alleged misconduct, even after
the most thorough investigation. In such situations, if the employer
chooses to take adverse employment action against the accused, the
accused can easily launch a counterattack by means of a lawsuit
against his or her former employer 3 for wrongful termination,4 defa-
mation,5 or even deprivation of constitutional rights. 6 The number of
* Class of 2001. Dedicated to Eugene and Susan H. Majeski and Lawrence
Handelman for their continuing support and encouragement.
1. See Patricia Jacobus, Turning the Tables, S.F. DAILY J., Sept. 7, 1999, at 1, 7.
2. See Michael Starr, Alleged Harassers Strike Back! Risks to Employers Who Overreact to
Complaints, 12 No. 10 CORP. COUNS. 1, Mar. 1998, at 1.
3. See Michael Delikat, Developments in Sexual Harassment Law, 630 PLI/Lit 283, 414
(June 2000).
4. An employer may be liable for the tort of wrongful termination if the employer
terminates an employee "for a reason that contravenes fundamental public policy as ex-
pressed in a constitutional or statutory provision." Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876
P.2d 1022, 1030 (Cal. 1994).
5. To bring a claim for defamation against an employer, the plaintiff must establish
that: (1) a "communication" was made which was "defamatory" in nature; (2) the commu-
nication was published to a third party or parties; (3) the communication referred to the
plaintiff; (4) the third party would understand the communication to be defamatory to the
plaintiff; and (5) the plaintiff was injured accordingly. See, e.g., Quinones v. United States,
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lawsuits brought by employees claiming to have been falsely accused
of misconduct continues to rise. 7
In 1998, the California Supreme Court decided a landmark case
which relieved California employers of much of the burden ofjustify-
ing the termination of employees accused of misconduct.8 In Cotran v.
Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc.,9 the court held that regardless of
the ultimate truth of the allegations, employers may escape liability for
taking adverse employment actions if, after conducting an "adequate
investigation" of the misconduct, they came to the good faith belief
that the misconduct more likely than not occurred. 10
After Cotran, the focus of "fight back" litigation brought by termi-
nated employees shifted from the grounds for dismissal to the ade-
quacy of the employer's investigation of the alleged misconduct.1 To
shield themselves from liability, employers now must ensure that the
investigations they undertake are both thorough and unbiased. The
most effective method of doing so is to utilize outside investigators
unassociated with both the employees and workplace dynamics in-
volved and thereby able to conduct a neutral investigation of the
misconduct. 12
While employers experienced temporary relief from the burden
of justifying termination decisions after Cotran, the California Su-
preme Court's efforts have been impaired by an opinion letter' 3 re-
492 F.2d 1269, 1274 (3d Cir. 1974). Furthermore, the offending communication must have
been made with malice, defined as "a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or
excuse." Id. at 1275.
6. SeeJohnson v. City of Menlo Park, No. C-98-2858 VRW, 1999 WL 551241, at *2-10
(N.D. Cal. July 23, 1999) (holding that defendant employer's investigation and termina-
tion of plaintiff did not violate plaintiffs: (1) Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure; (2) Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due pro-
cess; (3) Fourteenth Amendment rights not to be deprived of liberty without due process
of law; or (4) First Amendment right to freedom of expression).
7. See Starr, supra note 2, at 1.
8. See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998); see also
Thomas P. Klein & Richard H. Rahm, Despite Cotran, Employers May Need to Prove Misconduct
Charges, THE RECORDER, EMPLOYMENT LAw SuPP., May 1999, at S27.
9. 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998).
10. See id. at 422.
11. SeeJacobus, supra note 1, at 7.
12. See Eric Mason, Employers Should Keep Out of Sexual Harassment Investigations, THE
RECORDER, EMPLOYMENT LAw SuPP., May 1999, at S32-S34.
13. An opinion letter is an informal statement interpreting ambiguous statutory provi-
sions made by a government agency in response to an inquiry from the public. See Bruce E.
Yannett, 1I'C Applies FCRA to Firms, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 14, 2000, at C6. As one court recently
noted in dicta, opinion letters do not have the force of law that formal regulations do. See
Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 144, 148 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). While opinion
letters are not the "law," ignoring them is perilous. SeeYannett, supra, at C6. If noncompli-
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leased by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in April of 1999.14
The opinion letter, known as the "Vail Letter," interprets 1996 amend-
ments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 ("FCRA").
The FCRA is "the federal law that governs the acquisition and use
of virtually any type of information gathered by third parties on job
applicants and employees."1 6 Congress enacted the FCRA to protect
consumers from inaccurate and obsolete credit information that
could lead to the unwarranted denial of credit, insurance, and em-
ployment. 17 While Congress originally passed the FCRA "to protect
the privacy of credit report information and to attempt to guarantee
the accuracy of information supplied by credit bureaus,"18 the 1996
amendments have been interpreted to make the FCRA applicable to
"consumer reports" and "investigative consumer reports" of job appli-
cants or employees, including those that contain absolutely no credit-
related information. 19 Thus, the title of the FCRA is misleading be-
cause it contains the phrase "credit reporting," when it actually applies
to a much broader spectrum of reports gathered by employers. 20
The 1996 amendments to the FCRA require that an employer
both provide notice and obtain an employee's consent before ob-
taining a "consumer report" pertaining to him or her.2 It also re-
quires employers to make a full, unedited disclosure of the contents of
the report to the employee after it is received. 22 In April of 1999, an
FTC attorney released the Vail Letter, which stated that the procedu-
ral regulations of the amended FCRA apply to investigations of em-
ployee misconduct undertaken by a third party investigator for an
employer. 23 The FTC thereby created a Catch-22 for employers: If an
ance with an opinion letter is challenged in court, and the court agrees with the agency's
stance on the statutory interpretation at issue, it could lead to serious statutory penalties
for the attorneys, including punitive damages. See id.
14. Letter from Christopher W. Keller, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission, to Judy
A. Vail, Esq. (Apr. 5, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/vail.htm [hereinafter Vail
Letter].
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a-1681u (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
16. Littler Mendelson, PTC Determines that FCRA Applies to Workplace Sexual Harassment
Investigations, 12 CAL. EMP. L. MONITOR 3, 3 (1999).
17. See Meredith J. Fried, Helping Employers Help Themselves: Resolving the Conflict Between
the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Title VII, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 209, 219-20 (2000).
18. Delikat, supra note 3, at 420.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1999); see also Delikat, supra note 3, at
422.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (3) (A).
23. See William L. Kandel, Sexual Harassment, 67 PLI/NY 75, 156 (1999).
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employer wishes to utilize one of the most effective means of con-
ducting an adequate investigation of alleged misconduct in the work-
place-using a third party to handle the investigation-the employer
must not only obtain the accused's consent, but also fully disclose the
fruits of the investigation to the accused.24 Congress could not have
envisioned this expansive interpretation of the FCRA.2 5
Part I of this Note examines the Cotran decision, providing the
relevant background. Part II discusses the adequate investigation stan-
dard introduced in Cotran and clarified in part by subsequent Califor-
nia case law. Part II also discusses the effect of Cotran on employment
law in California. Part III introduces the FCRA and the Vail Letter.
Part IV discusses the effect of the Vail Letter upon investigations of
workplace misconduct. Part V explains why applying the notice, con-
sent, and disclosure requirements of the FCRA contradicts the Act's
statutory language and also fails to further the congressional purpose
behind the Act. Part VI sets forth the various solutions suggested both
by the FTC and members of Congress, who have currently proposed
two amendments in the House of Representatives. Part VI also dis-
cusses why each of these solutions fail to satisfactorily resolve the con-
flict between the FCRA and efficient investigations of workplace
misconduct.
Finally, Part VII concludes that while Cotran left several issues un-
resolved, its holding was an essential step toward helping employers
successfully sustain their decisions to terminate. This Part argues that
the FCRA's requirements should only apply to credit-related reports
acquired by an employer used to make the initial decision to hire a
prospective employee. If Congress wishes to provide protections to
employees who are the subject of workplace investigations, it should
do so in legislation unrelated to the FCRA. In the meantime, courts
should interpret the FCRA narrowly and exclude from its coverage
investigations of workplace misconduct conducted by third parties.
Without the stringent requirements of the FCRA, employers in Cali-
fornia and across the nation 26 will have the opportunity to conduct
24. See id.
25. See Yannett, supra note 13, at C6.
26. The restrictions of the FCRA applied to the investigations of employee miscon-
duct create difficulties for employers not only in California, but also across the nation due
to the United States Supreme Court decision in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
792 (1998). See CURIALE DALLAVERSON HIRSCHFELD KELLY & KRAMER LLP, Drafting an Effec-
tive Investigation Report: What Cotran and Ken Starr Taught Us, 1999 LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
LAw SyMPOSiuM 1, 2 [hereinafter 1999 LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAw SYMPosIuM]. In Faragher,
the Court held that employers can avoid vicarious liability for sexual harassment of an
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the most objective and thorough investigations to help rid their work-
places of illegal acts.
I. The Adequate Investigation Standard for Termination of
Employment in California
Credible and undisputed evidence of employee misconduct in
the workplace constitutes good cause for termination so long as the
termination is not based on impermissible considerations such as
union membership, race, sex, age, or political affiliation. 27 However,
California courts have been in conflict over whether allegations of
misconduct, coupled with a good faith investigation of the allegations
by the employer, are enough to constitute good cause for termination,
regardless of whether or not the allegations can be proven true. As a
result, a jurisdictional split arose in the California courts of appeal
regarding the standard an employer must meet for a good cause 28
termination. 29
Most employment relationships in California do not require good
cause to terminate.30 Unless a specified term of employment has been
agreed upon, or an express agreement not to terminate without good
cause has been made, an employee is employed "at will." 31 If an em-
ployee is employed at will, he or she is free to quit his or her employ-
ment at any time, and the employer may terminate the employment at
any time for any reason. 32 While the statutory presumption of at will
employment is strong in the absence of an express agreement other-
employee if the employer exercises reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct sexual
harassment and also if the plaintiff unreasonably fails to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective procedures provided by the employer. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792. For fur-
ther analysis of Faragher, see discussion infra notes 148-52, 163-64 and accompanying text.
Together, Faragher (which applies nation-wide) and Cotran (which applies in California)
"affirm the need for employers to implement effective workplace harassment policies and
conduct thorough investigations into allegations of misconduct." 1999 LABOR & EMPLOY-
MENT LAw SympOsIuM, supra, at 2. Cotran, however, heightens the need for employers par-
ticularly in California to conduct thorough and objective investigations of alleged
misconduct.
27. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 (Ct. App. 1981).
28. The definition of "cause" to terminate for purposes of this discussion applies only
in the context of an implied contract to terminate only for good cause. See Guz v. Bechtel
Nat'l Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 365 (Ct. App. 2000).
29. See Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1989); Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981); see also Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall
Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998).
30. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
31. See id.
32. See Guz, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364.
Winter 2001 ]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
wise, it is subject to limitations. 33 Even in the absence of an express
promises to terminate only for good cause, courts have been willing to
hold that an "implied-in-fact" contract has been made whereby the
employee may not be terminated except for good cause.34 An implied-
in-fact promise to terminate only for good cause can be established by
evidence, for example, "of personnel policies or practices of the em-
ployer, the employee's longevity of service, actions or communications
by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and
the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged."35
If the parties agree to at will employment or the employee is una-
ble to rebut the presumption of an at will relationship, then no cause
of any kind is required to terminate. 36 If the parties expressly agree on
the standard of proof for determining good cause to terminate, then
that standard will prevail. 37 However, the conflict that arose in Califor-
nia courts concerns the proper standard for determining good cause
in circumstances where the court finds an implied promise to termi-
nate only for good cause.38
A. Background: California Case Law Regarding the Evidentiary
Standard Necessary to Constitute Good Cause to
Terminate Employment
In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,39 the First District Court of Appeal
held that an employer is entitled to discretion when faced with allega-
tions of misconduct by one of its employees. 40 In Pugh, a vice presi-
dent of See's Candies ("See's") argued he had an implied contract to
terminate only for good cause, 41 Pugh had worked at See's for thirty-
two years and was fired for undisclosed reasons.42 Pugh speculated
that his termination was due to his objection to a union agreement
that allowed See's to pay its seasonal employees a lower salary.4 3 Pugh
sued See's for wrongful termination. 44
33. See id.
34. See id. at 365.
35. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925-26 (Ct. App. 1981).
36. See Guz, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364.
37. See id. at 365.
38. See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 414 (Cal. 1998).
39. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981).
40. See id. at 928.
41. See id. at 927.
42. See id. at 918, 919.
43. See id. at 920.
44. See id. at 918.
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The court disagreed with Pugh and held that See's had legiti-
mately exercised its managerial discretion in terminating his employ-
ment.4 5 The court stated that the proper standard for determining
whether an employer had wrongfully terminated an employee was
whether a jury could find "a fair and honest cause or reason, regu-
lated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power. '46
This case established an objective, good faith standard for discharges
based on employment contracts containing implied-in-fact promises
to terminate only for good cause.4 7
Subsequently, in 1989, the Second District Court of Appeal, in
Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank,48 set forth a conflicting standard for de-
termining an employer's liability after terminating an employee based
upon allegations of misconduct. In Wilkerson, Wells Fargo fired Wilker-
son for allegedly personally benefiting from bank transactions.4 9 Wil-
kerson denied the allegations and sued Wells Fargo for wrongful
termination. 50 The court remanded the case for a determination of
(1) whether there existed an implied contract to terminate only for
good cause, and (2) whether Wilkerson's termination was supported
by cause.51 More significantly, the court held that in a case of em-
ployee misconduct, the employer had to prove that the misconduct
actually occurred in order to justify the termination. 52 The court rea-
soned that regardless of good faith on the part of the employer, "an
employer's belief is not a substitute for good cause. For that reason,
the employer's broad latitude does not extend to being factually incor-
rect. ' 53 In cases of implied contracts to terminate only for good cause,
where the employer claims that "the employee was discharged for spe-
cific misconduct, and the employee denies the charge, the question of
whether the misconduct occurred is one of fact for the jury. '5 4
Before the California Supreme Court addressed this issue, the
majority of the California courts of appeal followed Pugh, finding that
regardless of the truth of the allegations of misconduct, an employer
could escape liability for wrongful termination as long as the em-
45. See id. at 928. The court reversed a judgment of nonsuit for defendant and re-
manded the case for further consideration consistent with its holding. See id.
46. Id. (citation omitted).
47. See id.
48. 261 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1989).
49. See id. at 187-88.
50. See id. at 188.
51. See id at 193-94.
52. See id. at 192-93.
53. Id. at 192.
54. Id. at 192-93.
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ployer acted in good faith.55 However, until the California Supreme
Court's landmark 1998 decision in Cotran, the conflict regarding the
proper standard for determining good cause in implied contract
cases, as well as the amount of managerial discretion afforded employ-
ers when faced with allegations of employee misconduct, remained
unresolved.
B. The California Supreme Court's Adoption of the Adequate
Investigation Standard in Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall
International, Inc.
The Supreme Court of California granted review in Cotran in or-
der to "clarify the role of the jury in litigation alleging breach of an
implied contract not to terminate employment except for good or just
cause, and to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeal.
56
1. The Facts
In Cotran, the plaintiff, Ralph Cotran, was a senior vice president
of Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc. ("Rollins"), an insurance
brokerage firm. 57 After Cotran worked at Rollins for five years, two of
his female subordinates accused him of sexual harassment, both say-
ing that the "plaintiff had exposed himself ... in their presence more
than once . . . [and] ma[de] repeated obscene telephone calls to
them at home."58 Immediately after the complaints were made, the
company president and human resources personnel met with Cotran,
explained to him the allegations, and warned him that an investiga-
tion would ensue .59 At the time of this initial meeting, Cotran "said
nothing during the meeting about having had consensual relations
with either of his two accusers, and offered no explanation for the
complaints. '60
Throughout the duration of the investigation of misconduct, Rol-
lins suspended Cotran's employment.61 The company interviewed
twenty-one of Cotran's co-workers, including five people that Cotran
requested be interviewed. 62 One of the women that Cotran requested
be interviewed described him as a "perfect gentleman," but later
55. See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 414 (Cal. 1998).
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 415.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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called to report "'a strange early morning phone call' from [Cotran]
which 'was not for any business purpose.' "6 A woman who previously
worked with Cotran at another company reported that Cotran made
obscene phone calls to her after a sexual relationship between the two
of them had ended.64
On the basis of the investigation, the company concluded that
the women's reports were credible, their stories were consistent, and
that "it was more likely than not the harassment had occurred. '65 Al-
though Rollins had no absolute and undisputed evidence that Cotran
engaged in misconduct, the company president decided to terminate
Cotran's employment based upon the investigative report and affida-
vits of the women interviewed. 66
2. The Trial Court's Decision
Cotran subsequently sued Rollins for wrongful termination,
maintaining that he did not sexually harass the women. 67 Cotran
claimed that he had an implied-in-fact contract for employment with
Rollins requiring good cause for termination.68 Cotran further argued
that since he had not actually engaged in the alleged sexual harass-
ment, there was no good cause for his termination. 69 At trial, Cotran,
in contrast to his silence during the company's investigation, testified
that he had affairs and consensual sexual relations with both of his
accusers. According to Cotran, he did not disclose these liaisons ini-
tially because he felt "frightened" and "ambushed" during the investi-
gation.70 Cotran further explained that he began seeing a third
woman, whom he later married, while still dating one of his accusers,
and that her accusations of sexual harassment were motivated byjeal-
ousy.71 Cotran also claimed that one of the women was using the sex-
ual harassment accusations to force Cotran to give her a substantial
increase in salary. 72 Both women maintained their allegations of sex-
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Id. No one interviewed said it was impossible for Cotran to have engaged in the
alleged activities. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 415-16.
68. See id. at 414 & n.1.
69. See id. at 414-17.
70. Id. at 415-16.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 416.
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ual harassment against Cotran, denying his contentions and testifying
that they never had sex with him. 73
After all the evidence was presented, the trial judge instructed the
jury that in order to defeat Cotran's claim of wrongful termination,
the company had to prove that he actually engaged in the alleged
misconduct which led to his dismissal.74 The jury found that the com-
pany failed to meet this burden and awarded Cotran $1.8 million.75
Rollins appealed, 76 and the Second District Court of Appeal reversed
in his favor.77 Cotran petitioned for review. 78
3. The California Supreme Court's Decision
The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's de-
cision and held that the proper balance between an employer's inter-
est in running its business efficiently and an employee's interest in
maintaining his or her employment allows an employer to be wrong
about whether misconduct actually occurred, as long as the termina-
tion decision was objectively reasonable and made in good faith. 79 In
so ruling, the court expressly rejected the Second District Court of
Appeal's holding in Wilkerson.80 The court reaffirmed that employers
are entitled to exercise substantial discretion in personnel decisions
and should generally be free from the threat of ajury second-guessing
their business judgment, particularly in handling high-ranking, mana-
gerial employees.81 The court held that "[t] he proper inquiry for the
jury .. . is [whether] the factual basis on which the employer con-
cluded a dischargeable act had been committed [was] reached hon-
estly, after an appropriate investigation and for reasons that that [sic]
are not arbitrary or pretextual."8 2
The court stated that it would be "too intrusive" to have juries,
who were removed from the "everyday reality of the workplace," re-
viewing the employer's factual conclusions months or years later.8 3
Moreover, the court said, "[i]f an employer is required to have in
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 421-22.
80. See id. at 414.
81. See id. at 421.
82. Id. at 421-22.
83. Id. at 421.
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hand a signed confession or an eyewitness account of the alleged mis-
conduct before it can act, the workplace will be transformed into an
adjudicatory arena and effective decision-making will be thwarted."84
The court found undesirable and contrary to public policy any such
dampening of an employer's willingness to act.8
5
At the same time, the Cotran court cautioned that employer dis-
cretion was not absolute and that an employer's factual determination
had to be a "reasoned conclusion . . . supported by substantial evi-
dence gathered through an adequate investigation that includes no-
tice of the claimed misconduct and a chance for the employee to
respond."86 The court declined to describe more specifically the es-
sential elements of an adequate investigation, instead leaving the mat-
ter to a subsequent case-by-case analysis. 87 The court also declined to
specify what role, if any, the jury would have in deciding whether the
employer's proffered reasons for termination were legally sufficient to
constitute good cause. 88
U. Analysis of Cotran's Adequate Investigation Standard
A. The Effects of Cotran on California Employers
Since the California Supreme Court decided the Cotran case on
January 5, 1998, it has had a great impact upon employers in Califor-
nia. While the supreme court's intent was to reduce the risk to an
employer taking remedial action to enforce laws against sexual harass-
ment and other improper workplace conduct, Cotran raised several
issues that must be dealt with in further litigation over the next several
years.89
The Cotran court de-emphasized whether the misconduct actually
occurred and turned "[t] he litigation laser . . . on the quality of the
investigation" of the misconduct.t However, an inherent, and argua-
bly inescapable, flaw in the court's decision lies in the fact that it en-
tirely fails to define what constitutes an adequate investigation.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 420.
86. Id. at 422.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 423.
89. See Lynn A. Bersch & Paul D. Fogel, Pandora's Workplace: Though Cotran Resolves a
Vital Wrongful Discharge Question, It Raises Other Issues that Will Keep Lower Courts Busy for
Years, THE RECORDER, Feb. 4, 1998, at 5.
90. Jacobus, supra note 1, at 7.
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Employers are under a great deal of pressure to take action
against allegations of sexual harassment and other forms of employee
misconduct in order to escape liability. The Cotran decision has served
to encourage claims by discharged employees based on the inade-
quacy of their employers' investigation of alleged misconduct.91 As a
result, California employers are presently feeling increased pressure
from two directions: from the employee who makes the allegations
(the victim) and from the employee against whom the allegations are
made (the accused).92
The judicial system has been flooded with an increased number
of employment claims. The United States Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC") has reported that a significantly in-
creased number of false sexual harassment claims are presently being
filed. 93 In 1999, immediately following Cotran, the EEOC rejected
7,243 sexual harassment claims for "no reasonable cause, meaning
that investigators were unable to substantiate the allegations."94
As a result, even more discharged employees are filing "fight
back" lawsuits. 95 These suits seldom survive summary judgment.96
While the Cotran decision has considerably reduced an employer's
burden to sustain a termination decision in misconduct cases, it has,
at the same time, burdened the court system with an increased num-
ber of lawsuits brought against employers by terminated employees
based upon claims that their employers failed to investigate
adequately. 97
Neither the California legislature nor the California Supreme
Court, in a subsequent decision, is fully able to clarify what constitutes
an adequate investigation of allegations of employee misconduct.
Each case is very fact specific and requires a unique form of investiga-
tion. The relatively ambiguous application of the adequate investiga-
tion standard to all types of employee misconduct to find good cause
for termination is left to be deciphered through future litigation. For
now, however, California courts have decided two subsequent cases
91. See Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. & Thomas P. Klein, California High Court Rules that Employ-
ers Can Fire Employees for Misconduct Based on Good-Faith Belief Resulting from Investigation, With-
out Actual Proof NAT'L LJ., Feb. 16, 1998, at B5.
92. SeeJacobus, supra note 1, at 6.
93. See id. at 1.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See generally id. at 1, 7.
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which help further define an adequate investigation introduced in
Cotran.
B. Subsequent Case Law Further Defines an Adequate
Investigation
In Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,98 Lucky Supermarket ("Lucky") dis-
charged Silva, a store manager who had worked there for twenty-eight
years, following a month-long investigation of allegations made by two
female employees that Silva had sexually harassed them.99 Silva de-
nied the allegations and "sued Lucky Supermarket for breach of an
implied contract not to terminate except for good cause and for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."100 The
trial court found no triable issues of fact and decided in favor of
Lucky. 10' Silva appealed. 10 2 The Fifth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed, finding that the investigation by the employer's human re-
sources personnel was adequate to sustain the discharge of his
employment. 10 3
The court began its analysis by restating the Cotran standard for
good cause in termination cases.10 4 First, the employer must have ac-
ted in good faith in making the decision to terminate. 05 Second, the
decision must have followed an investigation that was appropriate
under the circumstances. 10 6 Finally, the employer must have had rea-
sonable grounds for believing that the employee had engaged in the
misconduct.10 7
Lucky Supermarket had an effective written policy in effect re-
garding how to investigate complaints of harassment. 10 8 The investiga-
tion in Silva was conducted by a specifically designated independent
human resource representative, who conducted interviews confiden-
tially on the store premises or on the telephone. 10 9 The investigator
asked "relevant, open-ended, and non-leading questions" in an at-
98. 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (Ct. App. 1998).
99. See id. at 384.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 390-92, 395.
104. See id. at 387.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 388-94.
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tempt to elicit facts and "not opinions or suppositions."' 10 The investi-
gation included interviews with any employees who may have
witnessed the alleged conduct.III Interviews with the female employ-
ees who made the accusations were also conducted, giving them the
opportunity to clarify, correct, or challenge information provided by
the other witnesses. 1 2 The company then conducted an interview
with Silva to allow him to present his version of the facts and give him
a final opportunity to comment on all of the information gathered
during the investigation. 113 Although the court did find some flaws in
the investigation, it held that Lucky's decision to terminate Silva's em-
ployment was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. 14
In a subsequent case, Cozza v. Northrup Grumman Corp., 1 5 Cozza
sued his former employer for age discrimination and breach of an
implied contract not to terminate except for good cause. 1 6 Cozza's
former employer, Northrup GrummanCorp. ("Northrup"), main-
tained that Cozza had falsified documents and committed gross negli-
gence while handling business matters, which it claimed constituted
good cause for his dismissal.'1 7 Northrup conducted an investigation
of the alleged misconduct.1" 8 The investigation included a thorough
interview with Cozza; interviews with several other employees involved
in the misconduct engaged in by Cozza, who were also reprimanded;
review of a report by the company's Employee Relations Department;
and an opportunity for Cozza to present his case before a neutral
committee of three senior managers.11 9 The district court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment, finding that the company
had conducted an adequate investigation and had discharged Cozza
in good faith.1 20
The adequate investigation standard for establishing good cause
for termination is in its infancy and has not yet had the time to evolve
into a truly useful doctrine of law.12 1 Under Cotran, lower courts are
forced to contend with an entirely new issue in litigation of termina-
110. Id. at 392.
111. See id. at 388-91.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 391-92.
114. See id. at 394, 395.
115. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
116. See id. at 1090.
117. See id. at 1091.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1095-96.
120. See id. at 1095.
121. SeeJacobus, supra note 1, at 7.
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tion cases: Did the employer conduct an adequate investigation of the
alleged workplace misconduct? Employers are currently caught in the
middle of an ambiguous situation, which must inevitably be sorted out
over the next few years in further litigation of the adequate investiga-
tion standard. 122 Despite these valid concerns, however, Cotran un-
doubtedly was a useful step towards relieving some of the burdens
employers face when defending their decisions to terminate an em-
ployee accused of misconduct.
III. The Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Vail Letter
The current and more immediately resolvable problem faced by
California employers involves the Vail Letter,1 23 which interprets the
language of recent amendments to the FCRA.124 The Vail Letter states
that the FCRA applies to investigations of employee misconduct con-
ducted by third party investigators or attorneys hired by the em-
ployer.125 The effect of applying the FCRA in such a way has
significant implications on the effectiveness of investigations of em-
ployee misconduct across the nation, particularly in California in light
of Cotran.
A. The Regulations Imposed by the FCRA and Its Congressional
Purpose
The FCRA is a federal law that requires an employer to notify
employees and job applicants, and get their consent, before running a
credit or background check on them.126 Additional disclosures are re-
quired if an employer uses the information discovered "as the basis for
an adverse employment action against the employee or applicant." 127
The FCRA was enacted to protect consumers against the misuse of,
and inaccuracies in, consumer reports used to determine eligibility
for credit, insurance, and employment purposes. Specifically, the
intent of the FCRA was to assure, by means of fair and accurate
122. See Baxter & Klein, supra note 91, at B5.
123. See Vail Letter, supra note 14; see also sources cited and discussion supra note 13.
124. See Vail Letter, supra note 14 (interpreting portions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681,
1681a-1681u (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)).
125. See id.
126. See Perkins Coie, FTC Throws a Wrench into Sexual Harassment and Other Workplace
Investigations, 4 No. 9 ALA. EMP. L. LETTER 2 (Sept. 1999).
127. Id.
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credit reports, "public confidence ...essential to the continued
functioning of the banking system."' 28
"Supporters of the FCRA recognized that when inaccurate or arbitrary
information bearing on a consumer's credit trustworthiness was circu-
lated to lending institutions or used as a factor in employment, such
information could unjustly damage the consumer." 129 After Congress
enacted the FCRA, the FTC had the ability to "require consumer re-
porting agencies to maintain records, prevent the unreasonable or
careless invasion of consumer privacy, and encourage consumer re-
porting agencies to use fair and impartial procedures."
1 3 0
B. The 1996 Amendments to the FCRA
In 1996, Congress amended the FCRA.' 31 As a result of the
amendments, employers are faced with even further restrictions on
their use of consumer reports from outside consumer reporting agen-
cies. 1 32 A "consumer reporting agency" is defined as "any person
which, for monetary fees... regularly engages in whole or in part in
the practice of assembling or evaluating ... information on consum-
ers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third par-
ties."' 33 A "consumer report" is defined as any "communication of any
information . . .bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit
standing, credit capacity [or] character.., which is used or expected
to be used or collected in whole or in part for . . . employment
purposes." t3 4
The 1996 amendments obligate an employer to "disclose in writ-
ing its intention to acquire a consumer report and to receive written
authorization from the employee before initiating the inquiry." 135 The
employer must also provide the accused employee a full, unedited
copy of the investigative report upon its completion, but before taking
adverse employment action against the accused based on the re-
port.1 36 The FCRA also requires employers to give the accused em-
128. David B. Fein & Suzanne E. Wachsstock, Compromising Compliance: FTC Opinion
Undercuts Corporations' Ability to Unearth Workplace Problems, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 20, 1999, at
S34 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1994)) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
129. Id.
130. Id. at S35.
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. IV 1999) (enacting changes to FCRA effective 1997).
132. See id.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1994).
134. Id. § 1681a(d)(1)(C).
135. Fein & Wachsstock, supra note 128, at S34. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (2) (A)
(Supp. IV 1999).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (3) (A).
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ployee a description of the rights required by the FRCA in writing
before taking adverse employment action, such as termination or rep-
rimand. 137 If an employer negligently fails to comply with the FCRA,
an accused employee can bring an action for actual damages as well as
attorney's fees. 138 If an employer willfully fails to comply with the
FCRA's strict notice, consent, and disclosure requirements, an em-
ployee can also bring an action for punitive damages.1 39 Thus, the
FCRA provides employees who are the subject of workplace investiga-
tions another cause of action to bring against their employers in
court.
C. The Vail Letter
Neither the FCRA nor its amendments expressly regulate the em-
ployment relationship in any respect unrelated to credit.' 40 "The act
on its face has no application to internal employer investigations lim-
ited to misconduct in the workplace."' 41 However, on April 5, 1999,
FTC staff attorney Christopher Keller wrote an opinion letter in re-
sponse to an inquiry by Judy A. Vail, stating that the FCRA applies to
internal investigations of employee misconduct. 142 The Vail Letter
specifically "concluded that 'outside organizations utilized by employ-
ers to assist in their investigations of harassment claims' may be con-
sumer reporting agencies ... and, if so, the reports they issue would
constitute investigative consumer reports subject to the FCRA."1 43
The FTC interprets the FCRA to extend to harassment investiga-
tions conducted by outside agencies for three reasons. First, an
outside agency "assembles or evaluates" information upon the em-
ployer's request and is, therefore, a "consumer reporting agency."'144
Second, the report prepared by the agency of the investigation is a
"consumer report" because it contains information reflecting upon
the employee's reputation and character. 145 Finally, the consumer re-
porting agency collects the information knowing that the employer
will use the report for employment purposes, namely to decide
137. See id.
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (Supp. V 1999).
140. See Fein & Wachsstock, supra note 128, at S34.
141. Id. at S35.
142. See Kandel, supra note 23, at 156-57 (quoting Vail Letter, supra note 14).
143. Id. at 157.
144. See Vail Letter, supra note 14.
145. See id.
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whether to retain an employee. 146 As discussed below, this decision
has raised significant concerns for employers across the nation, espe-
cially those in California.
IV. The Effects of the FCRA and the Vail Letter on
Investigations of Employee Misconduct Undertaken
in Light of Cotran
After the Cotran decision, multitudes of lawsuits arose challenging
the adequacy of employers' investigations of employee misconduct. 147
As demonstrated in Silva and Cozza, employer investigations in Califor-
nia have been placed under scrutiny, and their thoroughness and effi-
ciency are of the utmost importance.
The adequacy of workplace investigations of misconduct is also a
concern of employers across the nation. In Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton,' 48 the United States Supreme Court held that an employer can be
held vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a
subordinate. 149 The Court, however, "balanced the employer's high
risk of liability under such a theory by establishing a potential affirma-
tive defense."' 50 An employer can shield itself from vicarious liability if
(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct the
harassment, and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advan-
tage of any preventive or corrective procedures provided by the
employer.' 51
Thus, under both California and federal case law, the objective
nature and adequacy of investigations of employee misconduct are
crucial to avoid liability. As a result, employers should use outside par-
ties to conduct these investigations, rather than in-house counsel and
human resource personnel, in order to guarantee the highest degree
of trustworthiness and to avoid bias.152
146. See id.
147. SeeJacobus, supra note 1, at 7.
148. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
149. See id. at 780.
150. 1999 LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW SYMPOSIUM, supra note 26, at 2.
151. See Faraghe, 524 U.S. at 807.
152. See Mason, supra note 12, at S32.
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A. California Employers Need Third Party Investigators to
Conduct an Adequate Investigation of Workplace
Misconduct
1. Problems with Using Human Resources Personnel
Traditionally, human resource personnel and in-house counsel,
both internal parties not subject to the regulations of the FCRA, have
been utilized to conduct investigations of employee misconduct. 53
However, in light of the increased emphasis on the objectiveness of
such investigations in California since Cotran, it is no longer wise for
employers to allow these employees to conduct the investigations.
Human resource personnel can conduct such investigations in
some straightforward cases, such as in Silva, where "the issues [are]
relatively simple and key facts [are] not in dispute."'154 However, un-
like Silva, "many sexual harassment claims, especially hostile work en-
vironment claims in which no allegations of physical contact are
made, are far more problematic. Context and atmosphere come into
play, and decisions by employers as to remedial action become more
perilous.' 55
In order for an employer to succeed in an action challenging the
adequacy of an investigation of workplace misconduct, it is of the ut-
most importance that the investigation be viewed as objective.' 5 6
"[H] uman resources employees may be incapable of objectivity due to
inextricable links to the political fabric of the office. Office alliances
and enmities can be very difficult to overcome for an employee-inves-
tigator steeped in them or buffeted by them."157 The accuser and the
accused may rightfully be afraid that their statements will not be accu-
rately recorded or their claims may not thoroughly be considered if a
company employee, too involved in the action or personally close to a
party, conducts the inquiry.158 If the fitness, ability, experience, or le-
gal knowledgeability of human resources to investigate a claim comes
under scrutiny, the employer's exposure to litigation can significantly
increase. ' 59
153. See Nancy L. Abell, Conducting an Effective Workplace Investigation, VLR 994 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 459, 469 (Sept. 14, 1999), available in WESTLAW at VLR 994 ALI-ABA 459.
154. Mason, supra note 12, at S33.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 832.
159. See id.
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It is incumbent upon the employer to conduct the investigation in
a manner that allows for the relative comfort of the witnesses, elim-
inating the threat of intimidation or fear of retaliation. Employees
often voice concerns that human resources departments are an ex-
tension of the authority structure of the employer, and, by defini-
tion, incapable of neutrality.160
It is understandable for employees to fear that investigations of these
sensitive issues might be biased if done by one close to the manage-
ment and other fellow employees. 16 1
"Moreover, if the employer's harassment policy itself is at issue, it
is awkward at best to ask a [Human Resources] employee to investi-
gate the nature and efficacy of the policy the [Human Resources] de-
partment itself implements. ' 162 As discussed above, in Faragher, the
United States Supreme Court ruled "in essence that an employer can
assert as a defense to vicarious liability the reasonableness of its sexual
harassment policy and the reasonableness (or lack) of the employee's
conduct in seeking to avoid harm.' 63 In order to make use of this
crucial defense, an employer is wise to hire a third party, experienced
and well-versed in employment law, to determine whether a policy is
reasonable or whether the alleged misconduct is included within the
prohibited conduct set forth in the policy.' 64
2. Problems with Using In-House Counsel
Problems similarly arise when an employer has its in-house coun-
sel conduct the investigation of employee misconduct. 65 Issues pre-
sent themselves in the areas of trustworthiness and bias. Attorneys who
insert themselves into the investigative phase of a case run the risk of
becoming fact witnesses because, especially after Cotran, the investiga-
tion is directly at issue in the litigation. 1 66 "The attorney may find it
rather awkward to confront a witness with a contradictory statement if
counsel himself was the person to whom that statement was made."1 67
Thus, the attorney many times has no choice but to either withdraw as
counsel or forego the opportunity to undermine the witness's credibil-
ity on cross examination. 168
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at S33.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See id.
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Furthermore, fruits of an employee misconduct investigation con-
ducted by an attorney are not privileged in litigation stemming from
the misconduct. 169 If litigation of employment misconduct ensues, the
employer must prove that the attorney conducted a proper investiga-
tion, analyzed the facts learned, and took appropriate action to pre-
vent the recurrence of the alleged misconduct. 170
If a defendant employer hopes to prevail by showing that it investi-
gated an employee's complaint and took remedial action appropri-
ate to the findings of the investigation, then it will have put the
adequacy of the investigation directly at issue, and cannot stand on
the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine to preclude
a thorough examination of its adequacy. 171
Therefore, if an employer chooses to have its attorney conduct the
investigation, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doc-
trine are thereby waived. 172
Attorneys clearly cannot both investigate employee misconduct
claims and shield the results of the investigation from discovery in
cases where the investigation is the focus of the litigation. 173 Conse-
quently, counsel for employers should stay out of the investigation to
avoid becoming a fact witness and to avoid limiting an employer's op-
tions in defending its actions.
Furthermore, small businesses many times "do not have the in-
house capacity to conduct thorough and credible investigations. " 174
As a result, small businesses frequently have no choice but to rely on
outside entities to conduct their investigations of workplace miscon-
duct. 175 Therefore, it is crucial in many instances for employers, both
large and small, to hire third party investigators to both avoid liability
and to have a sufficient opportunity to defend the adequacy of their
workplace investigations. 176
169. See id. at 832.
170. See Abell, supra note 153, at 469.
171. Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844, 856 (Ct.
App. 1997).
172. See id.; see also Mason, supra note 12, at S33.
173. See generallyJenna Ward, For This Mystey, You May Want an Attorney, THE RECORDER,
Apr. 20, 1998, at 4.
174. Fair Credit Reporting Amendments Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R 3408 Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Finan-
cial Services, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter FCRA Hearing] (statement of Ida L. Castro,
Chairwoman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), available at 2000 WL
19303231.
175. See id.
176. See id.
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B. The Regulations Imposed by the FCRA Significantly Decrease
the Effectiveness of Investigations Conducted by Third
Parties
Having recognized the need for outside investigators, employers
are faced with the dilemma resulting from the FTC's position de-
scribed in the Vail Letter that the FCRA is applicable to employer in-
vestigations of employee misconduct conducted by a third party.
177
The amendments to the FCRA require that employers who procure
"consumer reports" for employment purposes provide both a clear
and conspicuous disclosure in writing to the employee before the re-
port is obtained or the investigation launched.178 Employers must fur-
ther obtain the employee's consent to conduct the investigation.
79
The employer is also required to provide the employee alleged to
have engaged in misconduct with an unedited copy of the completed
investigative report and a description in writing of the employee's
rights under the FCRA. 80
"Requiring a suspect employee's consent prior to an investigation
and the full disclosure of investigative information to that employee
would all but eliminate a company's ability to receive information
from employees and to act effectively on that information."' 8 Many
employees alleged to have engaged in prohibited workplace conduct
would simply not consent, "thus ending the employer's ability to ob-
tain outside assistance in undertaking an investigation right from the
start."182 At the very least, by "strategically withholding consent, the
employee can delay an investigation or otherwise control its tim-
ing."' 83 This advance notice can provide the alleged wrongdoer the
ability to prepare his or her responses to avoid responsibility, influ-
ence testimony of potential witnesses, or even destroy evidence.1
8 4
Those employees who do consent are required to receive a full
investigative report by their employer, including all memos of inter-
views with co-workers.' 8 5 Thus, the Vail Letter will only serve to sub-
177. See Vail Letter, supra note 14.
178. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
179. See Kandel, supra note 23, at 158.
180. See id.
181. Fein & Wachsstock, supra note 128, at S34.
182. Id.
183. FCRA Hearing, supra note 174 (statement of Ida L. Castro, Chairwoman of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
184. See id.
185. See id.
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stantially limit future employee cooperation. 1 6 When deprived of
confidentiality protections, many witnesses will not come forward. 187
It could also breed hostility and retaliation within the company and
between employees. Furthermore, the effect of the FTC's opinion
"poses a real risk of harm to employees and others in the workplace
where the individual to be investigated appears to present a risk of
workplace violence." 188 While persons accused of harassment or other
forms of workplace discrimination should certainly have sufficient in-
formation in order to respond to charges and defend themselves, they
do not need the names of all witnesses or a full, unedited copy of the
investigative report. 189
The FCRA supplies an "important protection to prospective em-
ployees against the use of inaccurate, obsolete, or disputed [credit]
information that bears upon the employment decision."190 However,
the restraints of the FCRA as applied to investigations of employee
misconduct are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the FCRA and
place employers in an untenable position. 191 They must either con-
duct internal investigations without outside help or obtain the con-
sent of suspected employees before investigating, and then disclose all
results of the investigation to those employees. "It puts the employer
in the bizarre position of receiving a complaint and then having to get
the consent of the accused harasser to do an investigation." 192 The
drafters of the FCRA could not have envisioned this outcome.1 93
In California, the consequences of the FTC opinion expressed in
the Vail Letter are heightened due to Cotran. The adequacy of miscon-
duct investigations are pivotal in the litigation of claims brought by
terminated employees. Employers are now faced not only with an in-
creased number of claims challenging the adequacy of their investiga-
tions, but also with the severe restrictions of the FCRA which serve to
hinder the overall efficiency of the investigations that employers
undertake.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Teresa L. Butler, Credit Reporting Act Imperils Workplace Probes; Amendments Needed to
Allow for Confidential Investigations of Misconduct, FULTON DAILY REP., Aug. 5, 1999, at 12.
189. See FCRA Hearing, supra note 174 (statement of Ida L. Castro, Chairwoman of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
190. Fried, supra note 17, at 229.
191. See Fein & Wachsstock, supra note 128, at S34.
192. Kevin Livingston, FTC Drops Employment Law Bomb: New Opinion Says Harassment
Investigations by Lawyers Are Illegal, THE RECORDER, May 17, 1999, at 3.
193. See Fried, supra note 17, at 230-32.
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V. Applying the Restrictive Requirements of the FCRA to
Investigations of Workplace Misconduct Is Contrary
to the Language of the FCRA and Fails to
Further the Purpose of the FCRA
The FTC has stated that its expansive interpretation of "investiga-
tive consumer report" and "consumer reporting agency" is merited
because of important privacy and procedural rights the FRCA pro-
vides to employees when an employer retains an outside agency to
conduct a workplace investigation.1 94 Although under an extremely
broad reading of the FCRA, "the FTC position may be supported by
the plain meaning of the Act, it is not logical in practice." 195 Not only
does the application of the FCRA's stringent consent and disclosure
requirements hinder the overall efficiency of an employer's investiga-
tion of employee misconduct, but it also fails to serve the purposes of
the FCRA. First, an employer who utilizes a third party to conduct
employee investigations does so for a legal purpose, and not an em-
ployment purpose, and thus the investigative report is not a consumer
report under the FCRA.196 Second, applying FCRA in such a way does
not serve the stated congressional purpose of the Act.197 Finally, "the
employment agreement between the employer and employee should
supercede the obligations of the FCRA, just as an insurance contract
between the insured and the insurer supercedes FCRA
requirements."19 8
A. Employers Conduct Investigations of Employee Misconduct for
Legal, Not Employment, Purposes
The FCRA only applies when an investigative report is used for
"employment purposes."' 99 An investigative report is used for employ-
ment purposes if it is used to make an "adverse employment decision"
such as for corrective or disciplinary action.200 If a report is not used
for this purpose, the FCRA does not apply.20 1
194. See FCRA Hearing, supra note 174 (statement of Debra Valentine, General Counsel,
Federal Trade Commission), available at http://www.house.gov/banking/5400val.htm.
195. Fried, supra note 17, at 228.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 228-29.
198. Id. at 229.
199. See id.
200. See Vail Letter, supra note 14.
201. See Fried, supra note 17, at 229.
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One court has recently declined to consider an investigative re-
port of employee misconduct a "consumer report" as defined by the
FCRA because the purpose behind the investigation was to provide
legal advice to the employer in anticipation of litigation. 20 2 In Robin-
son v. Time Warner, Inc.,203 Robinson, an employee, brought a discrimi-
nation action against his employer, Time Warner, Inc., and sought
discovery of an investigative report prepared by Time Warner's
outside counsel to investigate Robinson's allegations. 20 4 Robinson re-
lied in part upon the FCRA and the Vail Letter as grounds for disclo-
sure of the law firm's report. 205 The Southern District of New York
held that the questions posed and the answers received by Time
Warner's outside counsel during the investigation of discrimination
were rendered in anticipation of litigation.20 6 Thus, the court found
the report "was prepared in order to provide legal advice to the com-
pany, and not for the purpose of evaluating Robinson and taking 'ad-
verse action' against him."20 7 The report was protected by the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine and did not
fall within the ambit of the FCRA.208
This reasoning also applies in the context of the California Su-
preme Court's decision in Cotran and the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Faragher. With the current emphasis on the ade-
quacy of employer investigations of employee misconduct both in
state actions against employers and in the formulation of the affirma-
tive defense to vicarious liability in federal actions, "employers have
greater incentive to conduct a full, adequate, and independent investi-
gation of sexual harassment complaints in order to strengthen their
defense in the event of a lawsuit." 20 9 An employer retains an outside
investigative agency, particularly outside counsel experienced in em-
ployment law, to provide legal advice to the employer when faced with
allegations of employee misconduct in order to avoid possible liabil-
ity. 210 As the Robinson court stated, these investigations are conducted
for a legal purpose. 211 The incentive for an employer to strengthen its
202. See Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 144, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
203. 187 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
204. See id. at 145-46.
205. See id. at 147-48.
206. See id. at 148 n.2.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 146.
209. Fried, supra note 17, at 229-30.
210. See id. at 229.
211. See Robinson, 187 F.R.D. at 146.
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defense is diminished if such investigations continue to be classified as
having an "employment purpose," and thereby hindered by the
FCRA's requirements of consent and disclosure.21 2 Thus, both Con-
gress and state courts should construe investigations of employee mis-
conduct prepared by outside agencies as legal documents not subject
to FCRA's requirements.
B. The FCRA Requirements of Consent and Disclosure Do Not
Further the Purpose of the Act
Congress enacted the FCRA to protect consumers' reputations
and credit-worthiness and the banking system from the effects of un-
fair credit reporting methods.213 The FCRA protects individuals from
being denied employment, insurance, and credit on the basis of inac-
curate or obsolete credit reports. 214 However, "[t] he FCRA is neither
a proper nor an efficient way to protect an employee accused of har-
assment from the reporting of, or an employer's reliance upon, such
information. "215
One accused of workplace misconduct cannot examine and cor-
rect errors in an investigative report in the same way that he or she
could review a credit report.2 1 6 The subjective nature of observations
made by witnesses during interviews makes it impossible for the ac-
cused to definitively prove information included in the report wrong
or inaccurate.217 The employer is simply "not in a position to check
the accuracy of the opinions and observations of the complainant-em-
ployee or other witnesses interviewed by the outside agency."218s Sub-
jecting investigative reports prepared by outside agencies subject to
the FCRA's provisions, including getting the accused's consent and
providing him or her with an unedited copy of the report, will not
increase the accuracy or truth of the information included in the
report.219
212. See Fried, supra note 17, at 230.
213. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994).
214. See Fried, supra note 17, at 220.
215. Id. at 230.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 231.
219. See id.
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C. The Employment Agreement, Not the FCRA, Should Protect a
Current Employee
The FCRA supplies significant protections to a prospective em-
ployee against inaccurate and obsolete information that an employer
may use when making an employment decision.220 The protections of
FCRA, however, should not continue to apply after the employer hires
the job applicant, thereby establishing an employer-employee rela-
tionship. 2 2 1 The FCRA is inapplicable to insurance company investiga-
tions of claims, 222 "indicating that perhaps Congress did not intend
the FCRA to apply after the establishment of a relationship between
the subject of a report and the person requesting the report."223 The
definition of "consumer report" under the FCRA includes any report
used "for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the con-
sumer's eligibility for.., insurance." 224 FCRA requirements, however,
"do not apply after the development of a contractual relationship be-
tween the insurance company and the individual, specifically, when
reports are prepared in response to an insured's claim on a policy."225
The differentiation between an insurer's initial insurance deci-
sion and investigations of insurance claims should also apply in the
employment context.226 The FCRA should protect only prospective
employees from the employer's use of inaccurate credit-related infor-
mation when deciding whether to employ an applicant.227 Once an
employer hires the individual, the FCRA should cease to apply.
228
"Rather, the terms of the employment contract ... [should] provide
the employee with adequate protection from arbitrary and unfair em-
ployment decisions made with respect to promotion, reassignment,
and retention."22 9
220. See id. at 232.
221. See id.
222. See Hovater v. Equifax, Inc., 823 F.2d 413, 419-20 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that
after a consumer purchases an insurance policy, the FCRA's requirements no longer apply
to investigations of insurance claims).
223. Fried, supra note 17, at 232-33.
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (1994).
225. Fried, supra note 17, at 233.
226. See id. at 234.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. Id.
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VI. Proposed Solutions to the Conflict Between the FCRA
and the Efficiency of Investigations of Workplace
Misconduct
Both the FTC and Congress recognized the difficulties faced by
an employer who both attempts to comply with the FCRA and uses
outside agencies to investigate workplace misconduct. 230 The FTC has
suggested several ways employers can avoid FCRA requirements, and
two statutory amendments have been proposed in the House of Rep-
resentatives to alleviate the dilemma. House Bill 4373231 is an amend-
ment suggested by the FTC that would provide employees some of the
FCRA consumer protections, yet allow an employer to retain an
outside agency to conduct workplace investigations. 232 The amend-
ment proposed in House Bill 3408233 excludes investigations by
outside agencies entirely from FCRA requirements. 23 4 These solu-
tions, as currently proposed, fail to satisfactorily resolve the conflict
between the FCRA and the efficiency of investigations of workplace
misconduct. 235
A. The Medine Letter
The FTC, aware of the problems caused by applying FCRA re-
quirements to investigations of workplace misconduct, has proposed
several solutions. David Medine, the FTC's Associate Director of the
Division of Financial Practices, stated in an opinion letter ("Medine
Letter") that the FTC appreciates and is "sympathetic to the practical
problems that exist in applying the FCRA to investigations by third
parties of workplace misconduct." 236 He proposed two solutions he
believed would allow employers to comply with the FCRA, while at the
same time disposing of the stringent consent and disclosure
requirements. 237
230. See id.
231. H.R. 4373, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
232. See id.
233. Fair Credit Reporting Amendments Act of 1999, H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1st Sess.
1999).
234. See id.
235. See Fried, supra note 17, at 235.
236. Letter from David Medine, Assoc. Dir., Division of Financial Practices, Federal
Trade Commission, to Susan R. Meisinger, Society for Human Resource Management
(Aug. 31, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov./os/statutes/fcra/meisinger.htm [hereinafter Medine
Letter].
237. See id.
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In the Medine Letter, the, FTC proposed first that an employer
may obtain employees' consent to procure an investigative report by
"routinely [obtaining consent] at the start of employment, thereby re-
lieving the employer of the awkward prospect of having to ask a sus-
pected wrongdoer for permission to allow a third party to provide an
investigative (or other) consumer report to the employer." 238
This proposal is not adequate.23 9 If Congress truly intended for
the FCRA requirements and protections to apply to investigations of
workplace misconduct, this proposal fails to serve its aims by ironically
allowing employers to force employees to waive their rights under
FCRA prior to the commencement of their employment. 240 The FTC
has stated that despite the conflict between the FCRA requirements
and the efficiency of workplace investigations, it is important that em-
ployees retain the protections of the FCRA.24' However, this FTC pro-
posal allows employers to dispose of the consent requirement before
an investigation is even necessary. Moreover, "routine notice and con-
sent would not satisfy the FCRA statutory requirements when a [con-
sumer reporting agency] prepares an investigative consumer report
containing interviews." 242 The FCRA requires additional notice and
disclosure when an investigative consumer report is procured, which
the Medine Letter fails to address. 243
The second proposed solution by the FTC in the Medine Letter is
equally inadequate. 244 In the letter, the FTC suggests that in order to
alleviate workplace tensions when disclosing the entire report to the
accused, an employer can request that "an investigative agency . . .
draft its report to the employer.., by not naming parties that provide
negative information regarding the employee." 245 This solution will
not aid an employer attempting to conduct a thorough and adequate
investigation to avoid liability under Cotran. Nor will it help the em-
238. Id.
239. See Fried, supra note 17, at 236.
240. See id.
241. See Letter from Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to Repre-
sentative Pete Sessions, United States House of Representatives (Mar. 31, 2000).
242. Fried, supra note 17, at 236.
243. See id The FCRA requires that notice of a pending investigation be mailed or
otherwise delivered within three days after the date on which the report was requested. See
15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a) (1) (A) (Supp. IV 1999). The employer must also "clearly and accu-
rately" disclose to the employee that the report to be procured will include "information as
to [the subject's] character, general reputation, personal characteristics and mode of liv-
ing." Id.
244. See Fried, supra note 17, at 237.
245. Medine Letter, supra note 235.
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ployer escape vicarious liability under Faragher.246 "A vague or incom-
plete report by a [consumer reporting agency] will decrease the value
of the investigation and the effectiveness of the employer's response
to a' harassment complaint."247 Furthermore, a plaintiff in a wrongful
termination action could easily challenge the report under Cotran
since "[c]utting names and critical information out of the report just
opens [employers] up to claims that the investigation is
incomplete.."248
B. House Bill 4373
Another solution posed by the FTC is a legislative amendment
proposed to the House of Representatives on May 3, 2000.249 House
Bill 4373 disposes of an employer's duties to provide notice to employ-
ees, obtain the accused's consent to proceed, disclose the report to
the employee upon adverse action, and comply with some additional
safeguards applicable for the use of the investigative report.250 How-
ever, House Bill 4373 leaves intact all other FCRA requirements, such
as the employer's obligation, in the case of adverse action, to provide
the employee "the name and other identifying information about the
[consumer reporting agency], and notification of the [employee's]
right to obtain a disclosure of the [report's nature and substance] ."251
In the case of an investigative consumer report, the disclosure would
include a "summary of the 'nature and substance' of the report," and
would allow the employee "to obtain a degree of meaningful, genuine
disclosure of the information that served as the basis for the adverse
decision. ' 252 By failing to fully remove investigations of employee mis-
conduct from the realms of the FCRA, House Bill 4373 only compli-
cates the FCRA and inadequately rectifies the inconsistency between
the FCRA and an employer's struggle to rid its workplace of
misconduct.253
246. See Fried, supra note 17, at 237.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See H.R. 4373, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
250. See Fried, supra note 17, at 237.
251. Id.
252. F)CRA Hearing, supra note 174 (statement of Debra Valentine, General Counsel,
Federal Trade Commission), available at http://www.house.gov/banking/5400val.htm.
253. See Fried, supra note 17, at 239-40.
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C. House Bill 3408
House Bill 3408 was introduced in the House of Representatives
on November 16, 1999.254 It is an amendment to the FCRA that would
exclude from the definition of "consumer report" all investigative re-
ports regarding workplace misconduct and also those reports pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation.255 This amendment, in effect,
creates a "blanket exemption" for investigations of employee miscon-
duct from the requirements of the FCRA.256 However, before taking
adverse action against an employee on the basis of an investigative
report prepared by an outside agency, the employer must still "dis-
close to the employee the nature and substance of the information in
the report on which the proposed adverse action is based." 25 7 Thus,
the FCRA requirements, even under House Bill 3408, would still ex-
tend to investigations of employee misconduct.
Although the two proposed amendments to the FCRA do exempt
investigative reports of workplace misconduct from most of the provi-
sions of the FCRA, they still require employers to comply with some
lesser protections afforded by the Act.258 The effect of either amend-
ment, if enacted, "would be to foster a piecemeal attempt of providing
statutory protection for an employee terminated or demoted on the
basis of a false or unsubstantiated harassment complaint against him
or her."259
VII. Solution
As soon as what constitutes an adequate investigation is further
defined by case law in California, employers will feel more secure in
their decisions to terminate employees based on allegations of em-
ployee misconduct. However, a change must occur that will exempt
employers from having to comply with the strict notice, consent, and
disclosure requirements of the FCRA when conducting investigations
of workplace misconduct. If Congress decides that an amendment to
the FCRA is in order, then it should consider an amendment that
would exclude from the FCRA "all employer investigations that in-
254. See Fair Credit Reporting Amendments Act of 1999, H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1999).
255. See id.
256. See Fried, supra note 17, at 239.
257. Fair Credit Reporting Amendments Act of 1999, H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1st Sess.
1999).
258. See Fried, supra note 17, at 241.
259. Id.
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volve, as subjects or witnesses, any employee currently employed by
the employer. ' 260 In the employment context, the FCRA should apply
only to consumer reports acquired by the employer used to make the
initial decision of whether or not to hire the prospective employee. 261
This would further the purpose of the FCRA and would protect job
applicants from an employer's use of inaccurate and obsolete credit
and credit-related information when making an employment deci-
sion.262 If Congress does wish to extend protection to employees possi-
bly wrongfully discharged on the basis of such investigative reports, it
should enact law to that effect unrelated to the FCRA. 263
However, even if Congress chooses not to amend the FCRA to
explicitly exclude current employees, courts should be encouraged to
construe the broad provisions of the FCRA narrowly "so as not to dis-
courage an employer's use of independent investigators. '" 264 The lan-
guage of the FCRA and evidence of legislative intent allow courts to
resolve the dilemma posed by the Vail Letter by interpreting the
FCRA as excluding investigations of workplace misconduct executed
by third parties. Many outside investigators will not meet the defini-
tion of "consumer reporting agency" because their primary purpose is
to provide legal advice to employers rather than compose "consumer
reports" as defined by the FCRA.265 Investigators arguably "do not pre-
pare 'consumer reports' as defined by the FCRA, because the em-
ployer requests the report, not to investigate the employee's credit-
worthiness, character or reputation, but rather to determine and re-
duce potential employer liability." 266 Thus, if interpreted by courts in
a narrow fashion, the lingering conflict between employers and the
FCRA can be eliminated.
Conclusion
The Cotran decision was a necessary step which, as soon as the
definition of "adequate investigation" is clarified through further liti-
gation, will relieve employers of many unnecessary burdens when
faced with allegations of employee misconduct. However, the Vail Let-
ter places an unreasonable barrier before employers attempting to
260. Id.
261. See id.
262. See id.; see also Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 144, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y
1999).
263. See Fried, supra note 17, at 241.
264. Id. at 240.
265. See id.
266. Id.
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both perform adequate investigations and escape vicarious liability by
using outside investigators. The "legislative history of the amendments
to the FCRA indicates that Congress was ... aware of the [effect the
act would have on criminal or misconduct investigations] yet decided
not to adopt a provision exempting employers from the requirements
of [the act] when obtaining consumer reports on employees sus-
pected of criminal activities." 267 However, Congress must be con-
vinced that the consequences are against public policy and that the
effects of the FCRA must be adjusted.
In order for Cotran to be fully effective, California employers must
have the ability to freely obtain unbiased and experienced outside in-
vestigators to decipher and fairly assess allegations of misconduct
within the workplace. It is therefore necessary for Congress to enact
another amendment to the FCRA explicitly exempting investigations
of employee misconduct from its guidelines and restrictions. It is con-
tradictory for the state and federal governments to require effective,
unbiased investigations of employee misconduct, while putting restric-
tions on the most effective and trustworthy methods of such investiga-
tions-the utilization of outside parties. Until Congress acknowledges
this dilemma, courts should be encouraged to disregard the Vail Let-
ter and construe the applicable terms of the FCRA narrowly so as to
not hinder employers' use of outside agencies to conduct their investi-
gations of employee misconduct.
267. Sidney R. Steinberg, Fair Credit Reporting Act Can Apply to Sex-Harassment Investiga-
tions: F'C Says Law Firms that Investigate Are "Consumer Reporting Agencies", THE LEGAL INTEL-
LIGENCER, Sept. 8, 1999, at 7.
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